Blog Archives - Page 15 of 24 - California Labor & Employment Law

Disability Accommodations for a Disability That Does Not Require Accommodations?

September 21, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

Disability accommodations – Moore v. Regents of the University of California. Let’s say that an employee approaches his or her manager, and asks for disability accommodations. And, let’s say that the employee does not actually have any conditions that qualify as a disability under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). In this case, can the employee be protected by FEHA if the employer refuses to consider granting the disability accommodations?

The answer, according to a California appeals court, is yes. In the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth District, Division One, found that an employer’s unwillingness to engage in an interactive process with an employee who requested an accommodation could constitute a violation of FEHA – even if the employee did not have a condition that meets FEHA’s definition of a disability.

Did the University of California Violate an Employee’s Disability Accommodations FEHA Rights?

Deborah Moore worked in the Marketing and Communications Department of the University of California San Diego. After she was diagnosed with idiopathic cardiomyopathy, she informed her employer. She was later demoted, and eventually, her position was eliminated.

Moore filed a complaint asserting that UCSD discriminated against her on the basis of a disability, in violation of FEHA. She alleged, among other claims, that UCSD failed to accommodate her disability. She also alleged that UCSD failed in its duty, under FEHA, to engage in a “timely, good faith, interactive process” with an employee who has requested accommodation for a disability.

The trial court that originally handled Moore’s case dismissed her complaint. It held that Moore did not have a disability that required disability accommodations under FEHA, and thus UCSD did not have an obligation to engage in an interactive process with her.

However, the appeals court disagreed. The court held that it is possible for an employer to violate FEHA by refusing to engage in the interactive process with an employee who claims to require disability accommodation, even if the employee ultimately was not entitled to disability accommodations.

According to the ruling, if an employer regards an employee as having a disability, then the employee is entitled to make a FEHA claim, on the grounds that the employer failed to engage in the interactive process. The Court held that the point of this process is to find appropriate accommodations for employees who have conditions that are considered disabilities under FEHA, or for employees who are merely regarded as disabled by their employers.

The Court held that it would be reasonable for a finder of fact (such as a judge or jury) to conclude that UCSD regarded Moore as disabled. On this basis, the Court ruled that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment on Moore’s cause of action related to failure to participate in the interactive process. [Read more…]

California Court Holds Class Action Waiver Violates Federal Law

September 14, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

A new federal class action waiver decision could have major ramifications for arbitration agreements. The opinion in Morris v. Ernst & Young declares that arbitration agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if they require employees to arbitrate separately.

The Forbidden Class Action Waiver

The arbitration agreement at the heart of the case stated that employees of Ernst & Young were required to pursue any legal claims against their employer through arbitration, and that they could arbitrate only as individuals in “separate proceedings.” The employees were required to sign these class action waiver agreements as conditions of employment.

An Ernst & Young employee named Stephen Morris filed a class action against his employer, in spite of the class action waiver arbitration agreement. He alleged that the company had misclassified him, and denied him overtime wages. When Ernst & Young filed a motion to compel arbitration, Morris (and another plaintiff named Kelly McDaniel) argued that the arbitration agreement’s requirement that proceedings take place separately violated the NLRA.

The case made its way to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The Court found that the clause against separate proceedings violates the “essential, substantive right” of the NLRA – the right of employees to pursue work-related legal claims together. The Court ruled that the waiver in Ernst & Young’s arbitration agreements dealing with separate proceedings is unenforceable.

The Rationale for the Class Action Waiver Decision

The Court pointed to Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Section 7 states that employees have a right to join labor organizations, bargain collectively, and “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection.” The Court held that the right to engage in concerted activities, as laid out in Section 7, is the NLRA’s primary substantive provision.

Section 8 bars efforts by employers to interfere with the rights guaranteed by Section 7. According to the court, an employer violates Section 8 by including a waiver in an arbitration agreement that prevents concerted activities by employees – and it violates Section 8 a second time if it requires employees to sign such an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment.

The Court highlighted the distinction between procedural rights and substantive rights. One of the differences between procedural rights and substantive rights is that substantive rights cannot be waived in arbitration agreements. According to the ruling, the right of employees to pursue their claims together is a substantive right – and thus the Federal Arbitration Act does not require the “separate proceedings” waiver in the arbitration agreement to be enforced.

The Effect of the Ruling

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California has jurisdiction over Alameda, Contra Costa, Del Norte, Humboldt, Lake, Marin, Mendocino, Monterey, Napa, San Benito, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz and Sonoma Counties. If you operate a business in one of these counties, and you have been requiring your employers to sign arbitration agreements that contain a “separate proceedings” waiver, it may be time to speak to an attorney. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Binding Arbitration, Blog Tagged With: arbitration agreements, California employment attorneys, Santa Rosa Labor Attorney

Jointly Employed? New NLRB Ruling Has Major Implications

September 9, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

Does your business include employees who are jointly employed (meaning that they work for you and another employer), as well as employees who work only for you? If the answer is yes, a new ruling from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may complicate how your company handles collective bargaining.

In the case of Miller & Anderson, Inc., the NLRB was faced with the issue of whether workers who are solely employed by one employer can collectively bargain alongside jointly employed workers without the permission of their employers. It does not mark the first time the NLRB has ruled on the jointly employed issue. In 2000, in the case of M.B. Sturgis, Inc., the NLRB ruled that employer consent was not necessary. In 2006, however, the NLRB took the opposite approach in Oakwood Care Center, 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, and held that Sturgis was incorrect.

The ruling in Miller & Anderson is a return to the Sturgis standard. It holds that jointly employed workers in this situation can bargain collectively, regardless of whether their employers approve.

A Return to the Old Standard

This issue involves Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 9(b) refers to different types of bargaining units, such as “employer units,” “craft units,” and “plant units.” The NLRB has long held that when employer units contain employees who work for multiple employers, these “multi-employer” units can only bargain collectively with the consent of all parties – meaning all of the employers involved have to give their permission.

But what happens when some of the employees are employed by a “supplier” employer (such as a temp agency) and perform work for a “user” employer? (The NLRB refers to these types of units as “Sturgis” units.) Does a Sturgis unit constitute a multi-employer unit?

In Oakwood, the NLRB ruled that Sturgis units are multi-employer units. However, Miller & Anderson reverses this holding. It states that multi-employer units are created “without regard for any preexisting community of interest among the employees of the various separate employers.” According to the ruling, a traditional multi-employer unit contains employees whose employers have nothing to do with one another, aside from being in the same industry.

A Sturgis unit, on the other hand, contains employees who are all employed by the same employer (even though some of the employees are joint employees, who also work for a different employer). The Miller & Anderson ruling states that because workers in Sturgis units share an employer, Sturgis units are not multi-employer units, and that they meet Section 9(b)’s definition of an employer unit – which does not require employer consent to bargain collectively. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, Employment Law Tagged With: California employment law, lakeport labor lawyer, Petaluma Labor Lawyer, Santa Rosa Labor Lawyer, Ukiah Labor Lawyer

Employer’s Social Media Policy

August 30, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

What is your employer’s social media policy? Can employees be punished for criticizing their employers on social media? James Kennedy wrote some complaints on Twitter about Chipotle restaurants. One of these tweets criticized Chipotle for charging extra for guacamole. Another complained that the prices of Chipotle’s meals were excessive, considering the salaries of its crew members.

These kinds of tweets might not please Chipotle’s marketing department, but one would not expect there to be much fuss about them. There was a complicating factor, however – Kennedy himself was a Chipotle crew member. And Chipotle had a Social Media Policy Code of Conduct, which prohibited employees from posting “disparaging” statements on social media platforms such as Twitter.

Chipotle insisted that Kennedy delete some of his tweets. When Kennedy circulated a petition among employees in protest of the company’s break policies (Kennedy alleged that the company was not following its own regulations), his manager directed him to stop. When Kennedy refused to stop circulating the petition, he was discharged.

Kennedy alleged that he was fired in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). On August 18, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that he was wrongfully terminated. The NLRB’s opinion states that many of Chipotle’s policies are unlawful, including its Social Media Code of Conduct.

The Chipotle Social Media Policy Ruling

The Board’s social media policy ruling ordered Chipotle to do all of the following:

Offer Kennedy his job back, or a substantially equivalent job (if his former job no longer existed).
Pay Kennedy for his lost salary and benefits.
Remove any references to Kennedy’s discharge in its files.
Allow its workers to circulate petitions regarding employment conditions.
Stop enforcing its Social Media Policy Code of Conduct, which prohibits employees from posting “incomplete, confidential or inaccurate information and making disparaging, false, or misleading statements.”
Stop enforcing its “Solicitation Policy,” which prohibits employees from soliciting even when they are off the clock, if they are in working areas, and the solicitation could be seen or heard by customers.
Stop enforcing its “Chipotle’s Confidential Information” rule, which limits how employees may use the name of the restaurant.
Stop enforcing its “Ethical Communications” rule, which directs employees to “avoid exaggeration, guesswork, and derogatory characterizations of people and their motives.”
Stop prohibiting its employees from discussing politics, and from using the restaurant’s name for political purposes.
Post notices in specified locations in Chipotle facilities which inform employees that the NLRB found that their employer violated federal labor law. The notices also inform employees of their labor rights, and explain that Chipotle will no longer maintain certain policies (such as the Social Media Code of Conduct, the Solicitation Policy, the Chipotle’s Confidential Information rule, and the Ethical Communications rule).

Transgender Employees Health Plan Discrimination

August 29, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

Robinson v. Dignity Health When does a health plan discriminate against transgender employees? A complaint has been filed against the San Francisco-based company Dignity Health on behalf of one of its employees, a transgender nurse. The complaint alleges that his employer categorically discriminates against transgender employees on the basis of their gender by denying coverage of their health care expenses related to gender dysphoria.

The plaintiff, Josef Robinson, works as a nurse at a medical center in Arizona operated by Dignity Health. Robinson was assigned the sex of female at birth, but identifies as male. He sought coverage through his employee health plan for health care related to gender dysphoria, including hormone therapy treatments and double mastectomy surgery.

However, the Dignity Health Plan denies “treatment, drugs, medicines, services and supplies for, or leading to, sex transformation surgery.” As a result, Robinson has paid out of pocket for his hormone therapy treatments, and his request for pre-authorization for double mastectomy surgery was denied. The denial letter stated that the Dignity Health Plan’s exclusion of expenses related to sex transformation surgery means that all treatments related to the diagnosis of gender dysphoria are excluded. After learning about this denial, Robinson cancelled the surgery.

Allegations of Transgender Employees Discrimination

After Robinson was denied coverage, Dignity Health was asked to revise its policies regarding medical expenses related to gender dysphoria. The company responded that it would look into the matter, and later issued a statement expressing that it determined that there was no evidence of discriminatory practice in the health plan. Robinson then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that these policies discriminate against transgender employees on the basis of gender. This led to the ACLU filing a complaint against Dignity Health in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco on June 6, 2016.

The ACLU’s complaint argues that denying coverage for health care related to gender dysphoria is a form of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it discriminates based on gender nonconformity. The complaint also argues that the denial of coverage is a violation of the Affordable Care Act, which states that covered entities providing health insurance may not categorically exclude all health services related to gender transition.

In May 2016, a judge in Minnesota dismissed a federal lawsuit filed against an employer by an employee whose teenage son was denied health care coverage related to gender dysphoria. In that case, the complaint was rejected on the grounds that the employee was the wrong defendant because she did not personally suffer discrimination. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, Employment Discrimination Tagged With: discrimination attorney, employment law, Transgender Employees Rights Attorney, transgender rights

Collecting Attorney Fees in EEOC Discrimination Case

August 18, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

New Supreme Court ruling is a boon to employers hoping to collect attorney’s fees in an EEOC discrimination case. If your company is dealing with an EEOC complaint, you will most likely find the Supreme Court’s recent decision in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to be welcome news. The case involved a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that a defendant in a Title VII case (such as an employer) is only entitled to payment for its attorney’s fees if it prevails in court after a “ruling on the merits.” The Supreme Court overturned this decision, and held that it is possible for a defendant to prevail and receive compensation for attorney’s fees, even without a ruling on the merits.

EEOC Discrimination Case Background

CRST’s EEOC discrimination case legal battle (which has lasted for over a decade) began when an employee named Monika Starke filed a complaint with the EEOC in 2005. She alleged that, over the course of her training as a truck driver, she was sexually harassed by two of her trainers. CRST denied the allegations. When the EEOC investigated, it discovered that four other employees had filed complaints. The EEOC ultimately found that there was reasonable cause to believe that an entire class of employees had been subjected to sexual harassment, and filed a lawsuit against CRST under Title VII on behalf of the aggrieved employees.

The EEOC eventually named more than 250 female employees of CRST as victims of sexual harassment. At trial, the District Court found that the EEOC had not satisfied its presuit requirements, and barred the EEOC from seeking relief for any of the employees. When CRST requested compensation for its EEOC discrimination case legal fees, the District Court approved the motion, and awarded CRST over $4 million in attorney’s fees.

An appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that CRST should not receive compensation for attorney’s fees. It reasoned that, due to precedent, only “prevailing” parties can receive compensation for attorney’s fees, and a party can only prevail if there has been a judicial determination of the plaintiff’s case on the merits. Because some of the complaints were thrown out due to the EEOC’s handling of the presuit requirements, the Court found that there had not been a ruling on the merits. According to the Court, there is a distinction between a ruling based on the elements of a claim (which would constitute a determination on the merits), and a ruling based on prerequisites to filing suit.

The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that there should be no requirement that a case be resolved “on the merits” in order for the defendant to be awarded attorney’s fees. According to the Court’s ruling, common sense dictates that a defendant has prevailed whenever a plaintiff’s claim has been rejected. The Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, remanded the case for further proceedings, and urged the lower courts to expedite the resolution because the dispute has already taken so much time. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, California Labor Law, Sexual Harassment Tagged With: California labor law attorney, Lakeport sexual harassment attorney, petaluma sexual harassment attorney, santa rosa sexual harassment attorney, sexual harassment, ukiah sexual harassment attorney

New California Law Will Change Pay Stub Requirements

August 16, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

On July 22, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill that will change pay stub requirements, allowing California employers to include less information on some of your employee wage statements. Assembly Bill No. 2535 amends Section 226 of the California Labor Code, which lays out what information must be listed on your pay stub, and which employees must receive them. The bill creates an additional exemption, regarding which employees must be provided with a list of how many hours they worked – meaning that fewer workers will be entitled to receive such a list.

Under existing law, all employees must be provided with a pay stub either at the time they are paid, or semimonthly. The wage statement must include certain types of information, including:

Gross wages earned
Net wages earned
The number of piece-rate units earned
Deductions
The dates of the pay period in question
The employee’s name, and the last four digits of the employee’s social security number or employee identification number, and
The employer’s name and address.

An employer is also required to list the hours that the employee in question worked during the pay period, unless the employee is a) a salaried employee, and b) is exempt from overtime.

What Pay Stub Requirements the New Law Changes

Under AB 2535, which takes effect on January 1, 2017, another group of employees will added to the hours exemption. Employers will not be required to list an employee’s total hours worked if the employee is exempt from the payment of minimum wage and the employee is exempt from overtime.

Some examples of employees who may fit this exemption are:

Outside salespersons
Employees working in an executive, administrative or professional capacity
Workers who are in their employers’ immediate families (such as someone who works for their spouse, their parent, or their child)
Computer software workers who are salaried employees in accordance with Section 515.5 of the California Labor Code (which makes certain software professionals exempt from overtime if they meet certain requirements)
People participating in (or working as staff members for) certain live-in rehabilitation programs focused on preventing substance abuse, and
Employees working in participation with certain national service programs.

Complying With Pay Stub Requirements

There are penalties for failing to comply with Section 226. An employer can face a fine of $50 for the first pay period in which it fails to provide an employee with the proper information – and $100 per employee per pay period for each violation in subsequent pay periods, up to $4,000. An employee who takes action against an employer regarding a Section 226 violation may be awarded costs and attorney’s fees. If an employer fails to allow an employee to inspect or copy records, the employer may be liable for a $750 penalty to the Labor Commissioner. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, Wage and Hour Law Tagged With: Lakeport Labor Attorney, Petaluma Labor Attorney, Santa Rosa Labor Attorney, Ukiah Labor Attorney, wage statements, wages

Unused Vacation Time Lawsuit – Reznik v. IBM

August 11, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

Reznik v. International Business Machines Corporation lawsuit. How much money is owed to an exiting employee for unused vacation time? Lots of us are familiar with “use it or lose it” vacation time policies – in which an employee forfeits any unused vacation time that he or she still has by the end of a year. In California, these types of policies are generally considered illegal. The California Supreme Court stated in the case of Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co. that when an employer offers vacation time, that time vests, and is protected from forfeiture of unused vacation time.

This means that when an employee’s position is terminated, the employee is most likely entitled to compensation for any unused vacation time that the employee has accumulated. Section 223.7 of the California Labor Code states that an employee in this situation must be paid for all vested vacation time at his or her final salary rate. (There is an exception, however, if a collective bargaining agreement is in place, and the agreement allows vested vacation time to be forfeited.)

IBM was recently accused of violating this statute by a former employee named Yakov Reznik.

Reznik began working for IBM in 2012, and went on long term disability in 2014. During his time at IBM, he did not take any vacation days. He maintained that IBM failed to fully compensate him for his unused vacation days at the conclusion of his employment – and alleged that IBM’s real vacation policy is significantly different than its stated policy.

Does IBM’s Unused Vacation Time Policy Violate the Labor Code?

IBM’s stated policy for employees working in California is often referred to as the “California Plan.” According to the plan, employees with less than 10 years of experience at IBM, such as Reznik, may accrue up to 15 vacation days per year. In addition, employees are given “personal choice holidays,” and are allowed to carry over up to six unused personal choice holidays per year.

Under the California Plan, Reznik had accumulated six unused personal choice holidays, and had accrued 15 vacation days. When Reznik left IBM, he was paid $12,502.75, which amounted to 25 days of work at the salary he had been receiving.

Reznik alleged that IBM’s practices did not adhere to the California Plan. He claimed that he had been shown a PowerPoint presentation which stated that unused days cannot be carried over from one year to another, and that they cannot be “cashed out.” He alleged that this represented IBM’s true policy on the accrual of vacation time. He also argued that personal choice holidays should be regarded as vacation days, and thus should be subject to Section 227.3.

At trial, Reznik’s complaint was dismissed. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted IBM’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Reznik received proper compensation for his vacation time.

The ruling pointed out that, regardless of the language of the PowerPoint presentation, IBM had allowed Reznik to accrue 15 days worth of vacation time from a previous year and had paid him for his six unused personal choice holidays as though they were vacation days. According to the ruling, Reznik was only entitled to payment for 21 days of work, and thus he had actually been overpaid by four days. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, Wage and Hour Law Tagged With: California employment attorney, employment law, vacation time

Criminal History and Illegal Employment Discrimination

August 4, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

When is it illegal for employers to consider an employees’ criminal history? Many employers in California are unaware that state law prohibits them from considering certain information related to applicants’ criminal backgrounds when they make employment decisions. Under Section 432 of the California Labor Code, employment decisions may not be based on the following information:

Records of arrests or detentions that did not lead to convictions;
Information related to an applicant participating in (or being referred to) a pretrial or post-trial diversion program;
Records of convictions that have been judicially dismissed, or ordered sealed pursuant to law; or
Records of non-felony convictions for possession of marijuana, if the convictions took place two or more years ago.

A proposed amendment to the California Code of Regulations would place additional prohibitions on which types of criminal history employers may consider when deciding who to hire, fire, promote, train, or discipline. Section 11017.1 does not specify any particular types of criminal history information that would be off limits. Rather, it would prevent employers from considering convictions that would have a disparate impact on employees and/or applicants, on the basis of characteristics such as race, gender, and national origin.

Criminal History and Defining “Disparate Impact”

If a selection procedure has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment opportunities of members of any race, sex or ethnic group, then it would be considered discriminatory, unless the procedure is both job-related and consistent with business necessity.

In other words, let’s say that studies show that members of a particular ethnic group are disproportionately likely to have been convicted of drug offenses. If an employer is refusing to hire applicants with histories of drug convictions, and a rejected applicant demonstrates that his or her ethnic group is adversely affected by this policy, then the burden would fall on the employer to justify the validity of its policy regarding drug convictions.

The employer could do this by showing that its policy is related to successful job performance, and measures a person’s fitness for the specific job. The amendment specifies that the employer must demonstrate that the policy/practice in question is appropriately tailored, by taking into account “at least” the following factors:

The nature or gravity of the offense or conduct;
The time that has passed since the offense or conduct and/or completion of the sentence; and
The nature of the job.

In order to show that the policy is appropriately tailored, the employer has two options. The first option is to conduct individualized assessments of the circumstances or qualifications of applicants or employees who are excluded by the policy.

If, however, the employer would rather use a “bright-line, across the board” policy of disqualification, then it has another option. In this case, the employer must show that the policy can distinguish between individuals who have acceptable levels of risk, and those who do not – and that the convictions have a direct and specific negative bearing on individuals’ qualifications. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Employee Data Privacy Tagged With: Employment Discrimination Attorney

Can Employer Confidentially Investigate Your Employee Harassment Claim

July 29, 2016 by Beck Law P.C.

Can an employer confidentially investigate an employee harassment claim? City of Petaluma v. Superior Court. In 2008. Andrea Waters became the first female firefighter/paramedic to work for the city of Petaluma, California. In 2014, she went on leave. Later that year, she filed an employee harassment complaint against the city alleging that she had been subjected to harassment and gender discrimination, in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

The city hired an attorney to investigate Waters’s employee harassment claims. The attorney signed an agreement stating that she would perform an impartial investigation. The agreement also stated that it established an attorney/client relationship between the attorney and the city.

At trial, the city asserted the “avoidable consequences” doctrine as a defense. The doctrine applies when an employee has failed to take necessary and reasonable steps to avoid the harm and/or consequences alleged in the employee’s harassment complaint. The city argued that Waters had never complained to her superiors about harassment or discrimination while she was employed.

During the discovery phase of the trial, Waters requested documents related to the attorney’s investigation. The city argued that the documents were subject to attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, and thus should not be subject to discovery.

What Constitutes an Attorney-Client Communication?

The trial court sided with Waters. It pointed to language in the city’s contract with the attorney, stating that she would investigate the Waters matter, but not offer legal advice. The court ruled that the attorney’s report was not privileged because without the presence of legal advice, it was not an attorney-client communication. The court also held that even if the attorney had offered legal advice in her report, it would not matter because the city waived privilege by asserting the avoidable consequences doctrine.

However, on appeal, a California appeals court overturned this ruling, and held that the attorney’s report was privileged. The decision, City of Petaluma v. Superior Court, states that a legal investigation such as Oppenheimer’s should be considered a provision of legal services, and thus should be subject to both attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.

The appeals court pointed to the California Code of Evidence, which defines the term “client” for the purposes of attorney-client privilege in Section 951. It states that a client is someone who consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer, or securing legal service or advice. According to the court, because either legal service or advice is sufficient under the statute, its plain language suggests that an attorney-client relationship can be established even when legal advice is not offered.

The appeals court also held that the city did not waive privilege by asserting the reasonable consequences doctrine because Oppenheimer’s investigation took place after Waters left her job. The court reasoned that the avoidable consequences defense deals with the actions taken while an employee is employed. Because the employee harassment investigation did not occur during the time Waters was employed, the court held that it was not directly at issue in the litigation. [Read more…]

Filed Under: Blog, Workplace Harassment Tagged With: Employee Harrasment Attorney